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11. Introduction
We consider a government facing a given consumption target for a group of commodities
(such as diﬀerent types of fuel), and explore how it should set taxes and subsidies on the
commodities to accomplish that target. Minagawa and Upmann (2018) formulated an op-
timal commodity taxation model under such a consumption target where non-compliance
with the target is allowed: a government chooses the consumer prices for a group of com-
modities to maximise consumer welfare minus the deviation cost of missing the target for
the total consumption of the commodities. In that paper, the authors obtained an uncon-
ventional taxation rule: the generalised anti-inverse elasticity result, saying that higher
prices should be charged for commodities with high price elasticities of total demand. An
intuition for this result is that in order to attain the consumption target, a more price elastic
commodity requires a smaller price change than does a less price elastic commodity. In
this way, the target level is attained by relatively small price distortions and hence in a
more eﬃcient way.
However, the taxation rule is derived from the first-order conditions, implicitly as-
suming that the second-order conditions (or suﬃcient conditions) for optimality hold.
Hence, the question of whether or not the taxation rule determined by the first-order con-
ditions is indeed optimal remains open. This question of the optimality of the first-order
taxation rules frequently arises in optimal taxation models where the objective function
is not concave in the choice variables, as discussed by Mirrlees (1986, Sec. 2), and also
cautioned by Myles (1995, pp. 113–14). But in the case considered by Minagawa and
Upmann (2018) this issue is particularly significant as their result is contrary to standard
taxation rules, which might raise suspicion on the optimality of that first order taxation
rule.
In this paper, we address this problem of the validity of the first-order taxation rules.
To this end, we consider the following optimal commodity taxation model under a con-
sumption target: a government chooses the consumer prices for a group of commodities
to maximise consumer welfare subject to the constraint that the total consumption of the
commodities must meet a given target. Since under standard assumptions on preferences
indirect utility functions are quasi-convex in prices, suﬃcient conditions for optimality
are hard to verify in that case, as noted by Dixit (1990, p. 84). To deal with this diﬃ-
culty, we choose an other route: we first demonstrate that there exists a solution to our
problem; it then follows that, under a constraint qualification, the solution must satisfy
the first-order conditions, and hence it obeys the resulting first-order taxation rule.
We next show that the first-order conditions derived here have the same form as
those in the model of Minagawa and Upmann (2018). Thus, the generalised anti-inverse
elasticity result mentioned above applies here as well, and it is indeed optimal. We also
2prove the uniform pricing result that the optimal consumer prices are all equal if, and only
if, the elasticities of Hicksian demand of the taxed commodity with respect to an untaxed
commodity are all equal and non-negative (i. e., weakly substitutable); under homothetic
preferences, this elasticity condition is equivalent to the condition that the elasticities of
Marshallian demand of the taxed commodity with respect to the untaxed commodity are
all equal. Finally, we provide an example that yields a unique optimal solution with
uniform pricing.
2. Model
Consider the standard consumer model with one untaxed commodity (commodity 0), the
quantity of which we denote by x0  0, and n taxed commodities of a specific group, with
an associated quantities x ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+. Suppose that a consumer’s preference
relation is represented by a continuous utility function: u : Rn+1+ → R : (x0, x) → u(x0, x)
satisfying:1
Assumption 1. The utility function u is strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave on
R
n+1
++ , with u(x0, x) = c for any (x0, x) ∈ Rn+1+ \Rn+1++ , for some c ∈ R, and with u(x0, x) > c
for any (x0, x) ∈ Rn+1++ .
Let q0 > 0 and q ≡ (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn++ denote the consumer prices of commodities
0 and 1, . . . , n respectively. Hence, the total cost of consumption of the taxed commodities




u(x0, x) s. t. q0x0 + q · x  I, (1)
which yields, for any (q0,q, I), a unique interior solution. This solution is represented by
continuous Marshallian demand functions, xm0 : Rn+2++ → R++ : (q0,q, I) → xm0 (q0,q, I)
and xm : Rn+2++ → Rn++ : (q0,q, I) → xm(q0,q, I). Correspondingly, Hicksian (or compen-
sated) demand functions are written by xh0(q0,q, v) and xh(q0,q, v), respectively, where v
represents a given utility level.
Let p0 > 0 and p ≡ (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+ denote the fixed net prices of commodities
0 and 1, . . . , n respectively. Let t ≡ (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ Rn denote the unit taxes imposed on
commodities 1, . . . , n. The consumer prices are thus written by q0 ≡ p0 and q ≡ p+ t, and
the government’s choice variables are the consumer prices q (or the unit taxes t). Let the
government’s objective function be the indirect utility function defined by V(q0,q, I) ≡
u(xm0 (q0,q, I), xm(q0,q, I)). Define the Marshallian total demand function for the n taxed
1We say that a function f : Rn → R is strictly increasing on S ⊂ Rn whenever for any a, b ∈ S such that
ai  bi for all i and a  b, f (a) > f (b).
3commodities by Xm(q0,q, I) ≡ ∑ni=1 xmi (q0,q, I). Then, the optimal commodity taxation
problem of the government facing a quantity constraint is:
Maximise
q
V(q0,q, I) s. t. Xm(q0,q, I) = Z, (2)
where Z > 0 represents a given target level of total consumption of x.2
3. Results
In order to establish the existence of a solution to problem (2), we make the following
assumption on the feasibility of the consumption target.3
Assumption 2. For any Z there is a price vector q such that Xm(q0,q, I) = Z.
We now prove the following existence result.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a solution to problem (2).
Proof.4 We first show that there exists a solution to the auxiliary problem
Maximise
q
V(q0,q, I) s. t. Xm(q0,q, I) = Z, qj  εZ, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (∗)
for some suitably small εZ > 0. It follows from Assumption 2 that for any given value Z,
there exists some εZ > 0 such that the set QZ,εZ ≡ {q ∈ Rn++ |Xm(q0,q, I) = Z, qj  εZ, j =
1, 2, . . . , n} is non-empty. That is, we can find a price vector q¯ ∈ QZ,εZ with xmi (q0, q¯, I) > 0
for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Let ¯V ≡ V(q0, q¯, I), which is greater than c ∈ R by Assumption 1.
We then define the set Q
¯V ≡ {q ∈ Rn++ |V(q0,q, I)  ¯V}. Let Q ≡ QZ,εZ
⋂Q
¯V . Since
q¯ ∈ Q, the set Q is non-empty.
In the following, we will show that the set Q is compact. First, we prove that the set
Q is closed. Let QZ ≡ {q ∈ Rn++ | Xm(q0,q, I) = Z}. By the continuity of the Marshallian
demand functions, the set QZ is closed in Rn++. Similarly, by the continuity of the indirect
2Some applications require a greater-than-equal-to constraint, demanding that total consumption of n
commodities may not fall short of some minimum level (e. g., merit goods), while other applications require
a less-than-equal-to constraint, demanding that total consumption may not exceed some maximum level
(e. g., demerit goods). Since in either case a binding constraint becomes an equality constraint, we consider
that case here.
3Since the case of a single taxed commodity is trivial—in fact, it boils down to the standard textbook
model with two goods: an untaxed good and a taxed good—we are interested in the case of two or more
taxed commodities (i. e., n  2). In this case, there are generically many price vectors leading to the same
level of total consumption (see Figure 1 for a case of two taxed commodities).
4The idea of this proof is borrowed from Iritani (1986, Sec. 1.6), who shows the existence of a solution
for the standard optimal commodity tax problem with a revenue constraint.
4utility function, the set Q
¯V is closed in Rn++. Then the set QZ
⋂Q
¯V is closed in Rn++. Let
QεZ ≡ {q ∈ Rn++ | qj  εZ, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}. The set QεZ is a subset of Rn++ and is closed (in
R
n). The set Q ≡ QZ ⋂Q ¯V ⋂QεZ is therefore closed (in Rn).
Second, we prove that the set Q is bounded. By way of contradiction, suppose not.
Then, there exists a sequence of prices {qν}∞ν=1 in Q with ||qν|| → ∞. Now, for each ν, let
rν0 ≡ q0/(q0 +
∑n
i=1 qνi ), rνj ≡ qνj/(q0 +
∑n
i=1 qνi ), j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and Iν ≡ I/(q0 +
∑n
i=1 qνi ).
By passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that the sequence of prices and
incomes {(rν0, rν, Iν)}∞ν=1 is such that rν0 → 0, rν → r′, and Iν → 0 where each element of r′
is in [0, 1] such that r′k is non-zero for some commodity k.5
Then, from the homogeneity of degree zero, we have for each ν, xmi (q0,qν, I) =
xmi (rν0, rν, Iν) for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Moreover, it follows that xmk (rν0, rν, Iν) → 0, since, by
the budget constraint, we have 0  xmk (rν0, rν, Iν)  Iν/rνk for each ν. But then, since
for each ν, V(q0,qν, I) = V(rν0, rν, Iν)  ¯V > c, Assumption 1 implies that there is
some commodity l such that xml (rν0, rν, Iν) → ∞ (since otherwise, V(rν0, rν, Iν) → c).
This implies, together with the quantity constraint Xm(rν0, rν, Iν) = Z for each ν, that
xm0 (rν0, rν, Iν) → ∞. On the other hand, by the budget constraint, we have for each ν,
rν0x
m
0 (rν0, rν, Iν) + rν · xm(rν0, rν, Iν) = Iν, which is equal to q0xm0 (rν0, rν, Iν) + qν · xm(rν0, rν,
Iν) = I. It thus follows that for each ν, xm0 (rν0, rν, Iν) = [I − qν · xm(rν0, rν, Iν)]/q0. Since the
right-hand side is bounded above, we obtain a contradiction. Hence, the set Q is bounded.
The set Q is thus non-empty and compact, and the indirect utility function is continuous.
Therefore, by Weierstrass’ theorem, there exists a solution of problem (∗).
We next establish the existence of a solution of problem (2). Consider the sequence
{εν}∞ν=N+1 where εν ≡ 1/ν, and thus εν → 0. Let N be a suﬃciently large integer. Then,
for each ν, there exists a solution of problem (∗) with εZ ≡ εν, and hence we may de-
note it by qνε. We will prove that the sequence {qνε}∞ν=N+1 has an accumulation point q∗
in Rn++, that is, {qνε}∞ν=N+1 has some subsequence that converges to q∗ ∈ Rn++. By way of
contradiction, suppose not. Then, only two cases are possible: (i) {qνε}∞ν=N+1 has no con-
vergent subsequence in Rn+; thus, ||qνε|| → ∞, or (ii) {qνε}∞ν=N+1 has some subsequence that
converges to a point in Rn+\Rn++. In case (i), by similar arguments to the above, we can
derive a contradiction. In case (ii), it can be proved as in Theorem 1.3.9 of Aliprantis,
Brown, Burkinshaw (1990) that there is some commodity l such that xml (q0,qνε, I) → ∞.
Thus, again, by similar arguments to those above, we obtain a contradiction. Therefore,
the sequence {qνε}∞ν=N+1 has an accumulation point q∗ in Rn++. Clearly, q∗ is a solution of
problem (2). 






i=1 qνi ). If qν1 = · · · = qνn
for each ν, then rνk → 1/n.
5The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure displays four diﬀerent indiﬀerence
curves, the curve of constant total consumption passing through q¯ and q∗, and the shaded
area representing the set Q
¯V . Then, given the level of total consumption Z = x1 + x2, the
utility maximising price vector equals q∗. (In our example provided below a closed-form










Figure 1. Curves of constant utility (red, thin) and constant total consump-
tion (blue, thick)
In the following, we assume that the utility function and the demand functions are
continuously diﬀerentiable. Let εmi j ≡ (∂xmi /∂qj)(qj/xi) represent the elasticity of Marshal-
lian demand of commodity i with respect to the consumer price of commodity j; and let
εhi j ≡ (qj/xhi )(∂xhi /∂qj) represent the corresponding elasticity of Hicksian demand. More-
over, we define the income share of commodity j by η j ≡ qjxmj /I. We simply write xi to
denote the level of the demand under consideration.
Suppose that at least one of the n derivatives (∂/∂qj) Xm(q0,q, I), j = 1, 2, . . . , n at a
solution for problem (2) is non-zero; then the usual constraint qualification, the so-called
rank condition, is satisfied. Since by Proposition 1 there exists a solution for problem (2),
q∗ in Rn++, the solution must satisfy the first order conditions. Using the Lagrangian for
problem (2), L(q, λ) ≡ V(q0,q, I)+ λ[Z − Xm(q0,q, I)], and applying Roy’s identity to the
6first order conditions, we obtain
−μx j − λ ∂X
m
∂qj
= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (3)
where ∂Xm/∂qj ≡ ∑ni=1(∂xmi /∂qj), and μ ≡ ∂V/∂I denotes the marginal utility of income.6
Remark 1. Equation (3) has the same form as equation (2) in Minagawa and Upmann
(2018). Thus, the main taxation rule obtained there applies here as well. To see this, let
σmj ≡ (∂Xm/∂qj)(qj/X) be the elasticity of Marshallian total demand with respect to the
price of taxed commodity j, and let ν j ≡ x j/X be the demand share of that commodity.
Then, we obtain from equation (3),




, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (4)
This implies the generalised anti-inverse elasticity result that the solution of problem (2)
is proportional to the price elasticity σmj (but is inversely proportional to the consumption
share ν j).
Moreover, the following uniform pricing result holds as well:
Proposition 2. The optimal consumer prices of problem (2) are all equal if, and only if,
the elasticities of Hicksian demand of the taxed commodity with respect to the untaxed
commodity are all equal and non-negative (i. e., weakly substitutable):7
qj = q, ∀ j  0 ⇔ εhj0 = α  0, ∀ j  0. (5)















, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6)
The left-hand side of equation (6) is independent of j, and we denote it by θ. Then, using







, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (7)
6Likewise, we may interpret the multiplier λ as the marginal utility of public consumption, since
∂V(q0,q(Z), I)/∂Z = λ where qj = q j(Z) is a solution of problem (2).
7This elasticity condition is the same as the necessary and suﬃcient condition for uniform taxation
(explored by Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Sandmo, 1974, and Sadka, 1977). That is, in the standard
optimal commodity taxation model, the same tax rates should be imposed on commodities if, and only if,
all commodities are equally weakly substitutable with respect to leisure.
7For equal consumer prices, qi = q ∀i = 1, . . . , n, the right-hand side of equation (7)
becomes (1/q)∑ni=1 εhji. Using Hicks’ “third law,” we get (1/q)∑ni=1 εhji = (1/q)(−εhj0).
Hence, all elasticities εhj0 ( j  0) must be equal, say εhj0 = α ( j  0). Substituting





8 together with the fact that εh00  0, we obtain
α
∑n
j=1 η j = −η0εh00  0; therefore, α  0.
(⇐) Substituting the relation ∂xh0/∂qj = ∂xhj/∂q0 = αx j/q0 into the Slutsky equation,
we obtain ∂xm0 /∂qj = φx j/q0 where φ ≡ α−(∂xm0 /∂I)q0 is independent of j. Diﬀerentiating
both sides of the identity q0xm0 (q0,q, I) + q · xm(q0,q, I) ≡ I with respect to qj and then
using ∂xm0 /∂qj = φx j/q0, we get
















= 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (9)
Hence, qi = q ≡ (1 + φ)λ/μ, ∀i  0, is a solution of equation (9).9 
Remark 2. With homothetic preferences, all income elasticities are equal to 1. It then
follows from the Slutsky equation in elasticity form that εhj0 = α ( 0), ∀ j  0 ⇔ εmj0 =
β ≡ α − η0, ∀ j  0. The uniform pricing result in Proposition 2 may thus be written as:
q j = q, ∀ j  0 ⇔ εmj0 = β ≡ α − η0, ∀ j  0. (10)
That is, under homothetic preferences, the optimal consumer prices are all equal if, and
only if, the elasticities of Marshallian demand of the taxed commodity with respect to the
untaxed commodity are all equal.
Example. Consider the consumer’s problem with two taxed commodities. Suppose that
the preference relation is represented by a Cobb–Douglas utility function u(x0, x) ≡ x0x1x2.
Let q0 = 1. Solving problem (1), we have xmi (q0,q, I) = I/(3qi), ∀i, and then V(q0,q, I) =
I3/(27q1q2). Next, consider problem (2). The first order conditions give rise to the unique
solution q∗1 = q∗2 = 2I/(3Z), which represents uniform-pricing since εm10 = εm20 = 0, and
8It follows from the Cournot aggregation, the Engel aggregation, and the Slutsky equation that∑n
j=0 η jε
h
jk = 0, k = 0, 1, . . . , n.
9If the matrix (∂xmi /∂q j) (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n) is non-singular, then the solution is unique.






































Since the determinant of this matrix is 27Z8/(128I3) > 0, the second order condition is
satisfied.10 Therefore, the price vector q∗ = (2I/(3Z), 2I/(3Z)) is indeed optimal.
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